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  Traditional economic models of savings treat the household as a single individual, and do 
not allow for the separate preferences of and possible conflicts of interest between husbands and 
wives.  Since wives are typically younger than their husbands and life expectancy for women 
exceeds that for men, wives may prefer to save more for retirement than do their husbands.  This 
suggests that households in which wives have greater relative bargaining power may accumulate 
greater net worth as they approach retirement.   
We explore the importance of bargaining in marriages of older couples by examining the 
empirical relationship between the net worth of couples in the first wave of the Health and 
Retirement Survey and factors that may affect the relative bargaining power of husbands and 
wives, such as control over income sources, relative age, and relative education.  We find that 
measures of long-term relative bargaining power of wives have a positive effect on the 
household's wealth, even when controlling for other factors.   
In general, the realized effects of reforms intended to increase private saving for 
retirement may depend on how these reforms affect household bargaining relationships, as well as 
how they affect individual incentives to save. 
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I. Introduction 
 
As the population ages, the welfare of older persons, the timing of retirement, and the 
costs of Social Security and other elderly support programs become increasingly important.  The 
decline in the household savings rate in the United States during recent decades and the projected 
insolvency of the Social Security system have focused attention on the wealth accumulation of 
older couples and their ability to maintain consumption after retirement.  If the savings and 
pension assets of married-couple households prove to be inadequate, the costs will be borne 
primarily by women, who are likely to outlive their older husbands.   
Most studies of life-cycle household behavior have focused on individual-based models 
of retirement and/or saving.  Bernheim et al.(1997), for example, attempt to explain the large 
variations in savings and wealth among households in terms of variations in time preference rates, 
risk tolerance, exposure to uncertainty, relative tastes for work and leisure, and other factors that 
can be incorporated into an individual life-cycle model, but find little support for such 
explanations. Although marital status has been taken into account in some of this work, 
interactions between spouses’ incentives and potential conflicts in their objectives have not been 
explored as a potential explanation of variation in savings accumulation and retirement timing.
1 
Husbands and wives may have different private interests in savings and wealth 
accumulation that must be resolved through some household decision process.  Because wives 
tend to be younger than their husbands and also tend to have longer life expectancies, wives have 
a longer retirement period to finance.  This suggests that wives should prefer a greater net worth 
at retirement and/or a lower level of household consumption, given fixed household lifetime 
resources.  If married couples differ with respect to the relative bargaining power of husbands and 
                                                           
1 One exception is Browning (1995), who uses the wife’s share of the couple’s income as a regressor 
predicting the household saving rate.  However, Browning does not focus on households near retirement, 
and does not find the expected relationship after controlling for other household factors.  The retirement 
behavior of married couples has been examined by Baker (1999), Blau (1997, 1998), Gustman and 
Steinmeier  (1998), and Hurd (1990).   3
wives, due to either individual characteristics or environmental factors, this may be one source of 
variation in wealth accumulation between households with comparable total resources.   
In this paper, we use data from the Health and Retirement Survey to examine the 
relationship between household net worth and factors that may affect the relative bargaining 
power of husbands and wives.  We find that measures which may reflect the long-term relative 
bargaining power of wives do appear to have a positive effect on the household’s wealth, even 
when controlling for other factors. 
 
II. Marital Bargaining and Household Savings 
Economic models of retirement and savings behavior typically examine the optimal 
behavior of a single individual who faces alternative streams of utility over the remainder of his 
or her life.  In general, however, retirees are not isolated individuals; the labor supply and 
consumption decisions of elderly couples will be the outcome of some joint decision-making 
process that reflects the preferences and interests of both husband and wife.  In recent years, 
game-theoretic models of family decision-making – including both cooperative and non-
cooperative bargaining models – have been developed and have received considerable empirical 
support, but have had little influence on the study of retirement and savings. 
Many of the important issues in the behavior of elderly couples involve circumstances in 
which there may be a conflict between the needs and objectives of married men and those of their 
wives.  For example, the causes of extensive poverty among elderly widows cannot be analyzed 
without considering the consumption/savings decisions of married couples.  Wives are typically 
younger than their husbands, and life expectancy for women exceeds that for men.  Consequently, 
wives may prefer to save more for retirement than do their husbands.  Recent discussions 
concerning individual control over Social Security assets and the fate of the spouse benefit bring 
into sharp relief the possible conflict of interest between elderly wives and husbands.  An   4
appropriate framework for analyses of these and other issues must allow for the independent 
preferences of husbands and wives and for the dissolution of a marriage through death or divorce. 
Lundberg (1999) suggests that bargaining models may help to explain some empirical 
puzzles, such as the failure of consumption profiles to correspond to the individual life-cycle 
model.  If the husband loses bargaining power when he retires from a career job, then a discrete 
shift in the household’s consumption/savings path may result.  Banks, Blundell, and Tanner 
(1998) find that the drop in observed consumption after retirement cannot be fully explained by 
standard factors, and that it is not consistent with the life-cycle model.  Bernheim, Skinner, and 
Weinberg (1997) also find a drop in consumption at retirement that is not consistent with life-
cycle consumption smoothing.  Lundberg, Startz, and Stillman (1999) find that the retirement 
consumption drop is characteristic only of married-couple and not single-person households in 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, providing support for an explanation based on shifts in 
relative bargaining power. 
  A growing empirical literature based on the bargaining (or collective) framework 
provides evidence that the share of household income controlled by the wife affects household 
behavior, including expenditures on various goods, individual labor supplies, and health 
outcomes for children.  Individual control of income may also affect saving behavior and 
retirement timing if there is spousal disagreement over desired wealth at retirement.  In general, 
bargaining models suggest that a variety of household and extra-household characteristics that are 
not usually included in savings and retirement models may affect relative bargaining power, and 
thus behavior. 
In a simple multi-period model, a married couple chooses a vector for each time period t: 
{} t t Wt Ht t S C X , , ,λ λ =  
where  it λ is leisure time consumed by the husband (i=H) or wife (i=W), Ct is household    5
consumption, and St household income saved for future consumption.
2  In the standard 
intertemporal unitary model of the household, Xt is chosen for each period to maximize a single 
household objective function,  () T WT HT W H C C u U , , ..., , , , 1 1 1 λ λ λ λ = .  This objective function is 
assumed to be well behaved, and is optimized subject to the household’s pooled resource 
constraint.  It is straightforward to allow updating as shocks are realized in order to make the 
model dynamic. 
An alternative to the unitary model allows the couple to “bargain” over values in X.  
Several household bargaining models have been proposed in the literature, including both 
cooperative (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney 1981, Lundberg and Pollak 1993) 
and non-cooperative models (see Lundberg and Pollak 1994 for a survey), as well as general 
collective models (Chiappori 1988, 1992) which do not impose a bargaining scheme, but assume 
a Pareto efficient outcome. 
The key distinction between unitary and collective models is that the latter allow for a 
separate utility function for husband and wife: 
()
() T WT HT W H W W
T WT HT W H H H
C C u U
C C u U
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One way of thinking about the household problem is to imagine some household objective 
function, which is a function of these utilities: 
() B u u w W W H , , =  
where B is a measure of the wife’s relative bargaining power, and can be thought of as a weight 
given her utility.  Generally, B may be allowed to change over time, perhaps unexpectedly, and 
we can allow current and future values in X to be updated when a shift in bargaining power 
occurs.  While the household budget constraint here is like that in the unitary model, components 
                                                           
2 There are well-known inefficiencies in allocating among private and public goods in collective choice 
models.  These inefficiencies and their implications for intertemporal allocation are beyond the scope of 
this paper.  We will not examine consumption directly, and do not make any claims about it’s private 
versus public nature.   6
in that constraint (i.e., prices and income) may affect the household objective function through B.  
For instance, if the wife’s relative wage rises, her relative bargaining power may rise, and thus 
her share of utility may increase in equilibrium.
3 
Because wives tend to be younger and to have longer life expectancies than their 
husbands, wives should prefer a greater net worth in periods near retirement.  However, it may 
not be the case that wives prefer a higher rate of savings in every period.  For example, if a wife 
prefers greater expenditure on certain children’s goods relative to her husband, then her optimal 
saving rate may be lower than his in some periods.
4  For this reason, we hypothesize that, in 






* *  
where 
*
it S is spouse i's optimal savings at time t.  Consequently, we will examine household net 
worth rather than savings rates. 
Most models of saving for retirement fail to take into account the household context in 
which savings decisions are made.  One exception is Gustman and Steinmeier (1998) who 
examine the effects of pension wealth on saving using HRS data.  They point out that pension 
coverage of the household, as opposed to pension coverage of the individual, is the relevant issue.  
They do not, however, focus on the effect of power over household decisions in their study.  They 
do include the share of household earnings accruing to the male in the household as an 
explanatory variable, but do not report the “effect” of this ratio on household savings in their 
discussion of results. 
Browning (1995) uses Canadian data to investigate the relationship between the 
intrahousehold distribution of income and household saving.  While the distribution of earnings 
and other income in the household may be endogenous, it is nonetheless interesting that a 
                                                           
3 “Equilibrium” here refers to the solution to the model, which need not be unique, and depends on the 
bargaining structure or other criteria imposed. 
4 Such expenditures on children may include clothing and food expenditures, educational expenditures, a 
lavish wedding, and assistance in buying a first home.   7
significant relationship between income distribution and savings is found.  However, the 
relationship Browning finds is in the opposite direction of what we might expect – the household 
saving rate is lower when the female’s share of the couple’s income is higher – and this 
relationship disappears when household income is controlled for.  Browning uses a sample of 
couples in which the husband is aged 30 to 59, so much of the sample is many years from 
retirement.  As discussed above, we might not expect to see an unambiguous relationship between 
savings and bargaining power among these couples.   * *
Ht Wt S S >  for all t is not necessarily 
implied by the argument that wives perfer higher wealth at retirement. 
We examine the relationship between the savings behavior of couples in the Health and 
Retirement Survey (HRS), and factors that may affect the relative bargaining power of husbands 
and wives.  The HRS provides longitudinal data on a recent cohort of older people, and offers 
particularly good information about their assets.  Reduced-form behavioral models based on a 
collective framework will be used to examine the bargaining relationship and how it affects these 
outcomes. We do not impose a particular bargaining structure.  Rather, we use a simple reduced- 
form model that will allow us to test whether our measures of bargaining power appear to affect 
household net worth.  Drawing on the theoretical model developed above, we hypothesize that 
* *
Ht Wt NetWorth NetWorth >  
in time periods close to retirement.  The magnitude of this difference may be affected by the 
difference in spouses’ ages, the couple’s permanent income, each spouse’s preferences for 
leaving bequests, and preference for consumption over time. 
 
III. Data  
  The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) is a national longitudinal survey of older 
Americans, with oversampling of blacks, Hispanics, and Florida residents.  The baseline survey 
(wave 1), done in 1992, was a face-to-face interview of a sample of the 1931-41 birth cohort and 
their spouses or partners if married or cohabiting.  Over 12,600 persons in 7,600 households were   8
included in this initial survey.  Follow-up telephone surveys are done every 2 years, with 
additional cohorts added in 1998.  For estimates in this draft, we rely only on data from wave 1 of 
the survey.  We will later include data from subsequent waves. 
We use a sample of married and cohabiting opposite-sex couples in which the male is 
aged 45 to 70 and the woman is aged 40 to 65.
5  These age limitations result in our excluding 225 
couples in which the spouse was substantially younger or older than the age-eligible respondent, 
but approximately preserves the mean age of men and women in the sample.  Individuals chosen 
for inclusion in the HRS were aged 51 to 61 in 1991, or married to or cohabiting with a chosen 
respondent in that this age range.  We limit the sample by age because we want to examine 
behavior of couples near retirement. 
The HRS data provide detailed wealth information, including that in housing, other real 
estate, motor vehicles, businesses, financial instruments, and other assets.  Detailed information 
on liabilities, including mortgages, home equity loans, business loans, and other debt, such as 
revolving account balances allows calculation of the couple’s net worth.
6  We have measures of 
the couple’s income in 1991 and it’s composition.  Earned income and pension income is 
attributed to the person who receives that income, allowing us to construct the wife’s share (in 
earnings and pensions) of the couple’s total income.  We also use educational attainment of 
husband and wife, as well as of their parents when it is reported. 
The HRS data also provide the labor market status, race, and self-reported ordinal health 
status of each spouse (five categories), and the couple’s geographic region of residence.
7  Table 1 
gives means for variables used in our analyses, plus some components of income and net worth. 
                                                           
5 For ease of discussion, we will refer to the male as the husband and the female as the wife, although all 
couples in the sample are not married. 
6 Our current net worth measure does not include the present value of future Social Security and pension 
benefits or the value of 401-K and similar plans.  These values can be calculated using restricted use data 
from Social Security records and employer provided pension plan details, and will be used in a future draft. 
7 State of residence is available in the restricted data, and will be used in a future draft.   9
IV. Estimation 
We augment standard models of household net worth by incorporating variables 
suggested by the household bargaining framework.  HRS data provide a number of variables 
which we believe may capture the relative bargaining power of each spouse.  These include 
control over income; relative age and education; and characteristics of the family of origin 
(parents’ education).  One important determinant of relative bargaining power may be the well-
being of each spouse relative to the other outside of marriage.  Spousal earned income and 
pension income, for example, may affect individual well-being in the event of divorce.
8  Current 
earnings and pension income are clearly endogenous to the household, but are important 
indicators of income control which we will want to examine.  Current earnings may represent 
only transitory income control, while relative education may be a better measure of long-run 
income control. 
  Using year of birth, we calculate the husband’s and wife’s ages in 1991. We include the 
difference in the wife’s and husband’s age as one measure of bargaining power, since she may 
have more power over household decisions if she is older, given his age.   As we discuss in the 
next section, this variable may also capture another effect for which the sign of the hypothesized 
effect on net worth would differ from a bargaining-power effect.  We use 5-year piecewise linear 
splines to control for age of husband and wife in order to allow for household net worth to vary 
with age in a general way.  We also use a linear spline representation of total income, dividing 
couples approximately into income quintiles. 
 
IV. Results 
  Table 2 presents results of a “standard” model of net worth, which includes only 
characteristics of the husband.  While there is no true standard model in the literature, those 
                                                           
8 Though it is not included in these analyses, claims to future Social Security and pension benefits are 
important determinants of welfare in cases of death or divorce which we will explore in a future draft.   10
which consider only husband’s characteristics are surprisingly common.  This model shows that 
relationships between household net worth and husband’s health, education, and race are in 
directions that we would expect.  Slopes of spline segments can be obtained by summing the 
linear slope and successive spline coefficients up to and including the segment of interest.  Older 
men have higher net worth.  Non-linearities in age allowed by the spline specification are small 
and generally not significant, but point to a flattening of the age-net worth relationship, 
particularly beyond 65 years of age.  There are significant differences in net worth across 
geographic regions.  Those in the south have significantly less and those in the west significantly 
more wealth than those in the northeast, which is the omitted region.  These differences may be 
driven largely by differences in real estate values and perceived future costs of living.  The 
couple’s current income does not appear to be strongly related to net worth in general.  A longer-
run measure of income would likely perform better.  We plan to include a permanent income 
measure from Social Security earnings records in analyses for a later draft of this paper. 
Table 2 includes two specifications, one which includes the husband’s current work 
status and one which does not.
9  Timing of retirement, and therefore work status, may be jointly 
determined with net worth.  We include the second specification to show that the data are 
consistent with this joint determination story: Those who are still working may not yet have 
attained the net worth they plan to have at retirement.  Those who are retired have significantly 
higher wealth than those who are still working.  This joint determination is being ignored in the 
present paper.  We plan to incorporate retirement timing into a more complex simultaneous 
model in future work. 
Table 3 shows results from a “unitary” model of household net worth, which assumes the 
household acts as a single economic agent.  This model includes characteristics of both husband 
and wife which might influence decisions made by a single household decision-maker.  We have 
                                                           
9 The six working status categories are not mutually exclusive.  The majority of the sample answered “yes” 
to only one of the categories, while a few placed themselves in none, two, or three of the categories.   11
shown all control variables used in the table.  Some of these will be omitted from later tables, as 
their effects are robust to various specifications.  
Better health, for either husband or wife, is generally associated with higher net worth 
(good health is the omitted category).
10  Wife’s education, which has a strong positive effect on 
household net worth, may do so through her higher permanent income, allowing the couple to 
both consume and save more in all periods. 
All non-white groups tend to have lower net worth than whites.  Here, we show only race 
of the husband.  We did run other models in which we included the wife’s race as well.  The 
husband and wife coefficients in those models approximately sum to the coefficients reported 
here for husband’s race, indicating that his race is a good measure of the total effect of race for 
the household.  This is not surprising as there are very few mixed-race couples in the data (about 
200 in the sample of 4700). 
Age, for both men and women, is positively associated with household net worth, with 
the slope of the spline function remaining positive throughout the age ranges included.  This 
suggests that couples continue to accumulate wealth at these ages, but perhaps at a reduced rate as 
they age. 
Table 4 presents estimates from two collective models.  These introduce some husbands’ 
and wives’ relative values as measures of relative bargaining power, allowing these relative 
values to affect household net worth.  Model 1 adds the age difference of husband and wife (her 
years less his years) and the difference in their educational attainment (her years less his years) as 
measures of bargaining power.  Model 2 also includes the wife’s share of current income.   
The effect of the education difference, defined as wife’s minus husband’s years, is 
positive, implying that the greater the wife’s influence over household decisions as measured by 
her greater relative level of education, the higher the household’s net worth.  Since we have 
                                                           
10 The causal direction of positive associations of health with income and net worth has not been resolved 
in the literature, and we will not attempt to sort it out here.   12
controlled for husband’s and wife’s educational attainment categories, which arguably proxy for 
permanent income of each spouse, the effect of the education difference is strong evidence in 
favor of a collective household framework as a basis for long-term savings behavior in multi-
person households. 
We also examined spousal differences in father’s education and in mother’s education as 
well as the wife’s parents’ education difference (her mother’s years less her father’s years) and 
did not find any of these to be significantly associated with household net worth, even if we 
excluded the wife’s education and the husband-wife education difference. 
The positive effect of the age difference on net worth is consistent with a bargaining 
power interpretation.  As we argued earlier, being older relative to her husband may give a wife 
additional influence over household decisions.  However, note that the age difference is perfectly 
collinear with the wife’s linear age term, given that we have controlled for the husband’s age.  
Thus, there are two alternative interpretations of this effect, with opposite predicted signs.  Recall 
that the younger is the wife given her husbands age, the longer her expected retirement period 
after his death.  This would imply a negative coefficient on the age difference variable as defined.  
The possibility that this effect may be partly offsetting the bargaining power effect of her age 
lends even greater significance to this result.  Another possible interpretation of her greater age is 
that she may have had more years of earnings to contribute to household net worth.  However, the 
magnitude of the effect we find seems implausibly large for this to be the only mechanism driving 
that effect. 
  We tried an alternative specification of relative age – the ratio of wife’s to husband’s age 
– which allows us to also include her linear age term.  The marginal effect of an additional year 
from this specification is virtually identical to that shown in Table 4. 
  The sign of the coefficient on wife’s share of current income is negative.  This variable is 
similar to that used by Browning (1995), where the dependent variable was the savings rate rather 
than net worth.  Similar to Browning, we find that the wife’s share of income is negatively   13
associated with a measure of household saving.  Current household income and the wife’s share 
of that income is highly endogenous to the household.  Her share of income may reflect largely 
transitory income components, or may be closely jointly determined with the household’s chosen 
ultimate net worth value and retirement timing schedule.
11  Given other evidence we find, and the 
problematic nature of this variable, we do not interpret this as a refutation of the collective 
framework and its validity in modeling household savings behavior.  We will use restricted data 
to construct a measure of the wife’s share of permanent income in analyses for a future draft.  We 
also note that relative years of education is likely a better measure of long-run income control 
than the share of current income.   
  Table 5 adds some relative health measures to the model.  If declining health results in a 
decline in control over household resources (e.g., through reduced earnings), then relative health 
of husband and wife may also capture a bargaining power effect.  Using a cardinalization of the 
ordinal self-reported health status (1=excellent, 5=poor), we try two measures of relative health – 
the ratio of husband’s to wife’s health and the linear difference in health (husband’s less wife’s 
cardinal measure).  The latter requires that we compress the five categories for health status of 
each spouse into three each to avoid collinearity.
12  The two models presented do not find a 
significant relationship between relative health and household net worth, and indeed the signs of 
the coefficients contradict one another. 
  Disability insurance, claims on pensions accrued over the lifetime, and other factors may 
make the relationship between relative health and relative bargaining power less than 
straightforward.  Permanent relative health may be more useful in a discussion of bargaining 
power, but how to construct a measure of it is not obvious.  It is possible that in the longitudinal 
HRS, we may be able to disentangle permanent from transitory health with some effort. 
                                                           
11 A measure of the wife’s share of permanent income is much preferred for the purpose of indicating her 
relative bargaining power.  We plan to use Social Security earnings records from HRS restricted data to 
construct measures of permanent income. 
12 Comparison of R-squares in a model with no relative values suggests we do not loose much by doing 
this.   14
V. Conclusion 
We find evidence that the wife’s long-run relative power over household decisions, proxied 
by spousal differences in age and education, does positively affect household net worth.  We find 
that the wife’s share of current income does not appear to increase household net worth as one 
might expect, but argue that this is a particularly poor measure of long-term relative bargaining 
power which is endogenous to the household’s saving and retirement plans. 
If husbands’ and wives’ preferences over saving and consumption do differ, and if 
relative bargaining power does impact household decisions, then policies which affect the balance 
of decision-making power in households have been overlooked as a potential means of increasing 
private household saving for retirement and perhaps age at retirement.  In addition, existing 
estimates of the effects of certain policies may be misguided in that they do not account for the 
household bargaining relationship in household decision making.  For example, reforms which 
encourage men to work longer may have two effects on savings: those caused by changes in the 
family’s constraint set and those caused by changes in relative bargaining power (since the period 
in which the husband retains control of a large share of household income will be increased).  
Policy changes which would reduce the marginal tax for working women, such as separate 
taxation of husbands and wives or eliminating the dependency of IRA deduction status on 
spouse’s pension status, may increase the bargaining power of women, and thus increase 
household savings more than unitary economic models would predict.  On the other hand, 
policies that reduce the fraction of income controlled by wives, such as a reduction in Social 
Security spouse benefits, may have the opposite effect.
13  In general, the realized effects of 
reforms designed to affect retirement timing or private saving for retirement will depend on how 
these reforms affect individual incentives, as well as how they affect household bargaining 
relationships. 
                                                           
13 This may be true only for women close to retirement age, and for younger women who will not change 
their lifetime labor supply in response to the change.  Reducing the spouse benefit increases the return to   15
  Our work on this topic is ongoing.  We plan to expand our set of indicators of bargaining 
power, and to add a model of retirement timing.  As mentioned in footnotes, we will add valuable 
information on permanent income and claims on future pension and Social Security benefits from 
restricted-use data which were not available for analyses in this draft. 
As we incorporate additional measures of relative power over household decisions, we will 
use a factor model to construct a measure of that latent unobserved variable.  This will enable us 
to isolate the common component of the multiple measures, avoiding problems of collinearity of 
these measures in estimates of net worth and retirement timing, and allowing some measures to 
affect wealth directly, as well as indirectly through bargaining power. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
work for some married women, particularly those who are many years from retirement, and may increase 
their bargaining power indirectly through increased control over earned income.   16
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Table 1 
Means of Key Variables 
 
Variable N  Mean  (Std  Dev) 
His age  4717  56.71762  (5.20891) 
Her age  4717  52.82107  (5.08505) 
Wife’s age minus husband’s age  4717  -3.89654  (4.77326) 
His health, scale 1-5, 5=poor  4717  2.57558  (1.18159) 
Her health, scale 1-5, 5=poor  4717  2.45855  (1.15021) 
His educ in years  4717  12.06445  (3.49616) 
Her educ in years  4717  12.12805  (2.88663) 
His mother's educ  4229  9.21518  (3.61911) 
Her mother's educ  4344  9.32366  (3.62224) 
His father's educ  4131  8.80174  (3.99475) 
Her father's educ  4198  9.13483  (3.93943) 
His earned income  4717  28451.54  (37482.12) 
Her earned income  4717  11827.73  (15432.87) 
His pension income  4717  2097.08  (6409.02) 
Her pension income  4717  242.37587  (1742.33) 
Household disability benefits  4717  713.39983  (3123.33) 
Total household income  4717  56172.32  (48967.61) 
Couple's total income  4717  52162.12  (48108.07) 
Wife’s share of couple’s income  4686  0.2365  (0.24561) 
Household total net worth  (thousands of $) 4717  219.0853  (389.76676) 
Net worth components (thousands of $) 
Net worth of 1st home  4717  69.41256  (94.58655) 
Net worth 2nd house  4717  12.85365  (91.43128) 
Net worth of other real estate  4717  43.86553  (208.96676) 
Net worth of business  4717  47.21871  (294.07081) 
Total financial net worth (not business)  4717  80.19603  (205.08104) 
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Table 2 
“Standard” Model of Household Net Worth 
 
  Without work status    With work status 
Intercept  -506.379* (285.575)      -377.736 (286.558) 
Couple’s income      -0.001  (0.002)         -0.0005  (0.002) 
Income spline: over $21,000       0.004  (0.003)          0.004  (0.003) 
Income spline: over $32,000      -0.004  (0.003)         -0.004  (0.003) 
Income spline: over $50,000       0.004**  (0.002)          0.004**  (0.002) 
Income spline: over $72,000      -0.001  (0.001)         -0.001  (0.001) 
Husband working           -51.44**  (24.623) 
Husband unemployed           -66.464*  (35.389) 
Husband temporarily laid off           -34.611  (45.172) 
Husband disabled           -27.928  (27.292) 
Husband retired            33.469  (22.469) 
Husband: other work status           -26.704  (57.027) 
Husband’s health excellent      47.17***  (14.566)        47.669***  (14.554) 
Husband’s health very good      22.403*  (13.4)        23.96*  (13.389) 
Husband’s health fair        5.728  (16.68)          2.743  (16.899) 
Husband’s health poor     -35.849*  (21.093)       -42.987*  (23.741) 
Husband’s education: 12 to 15 years      25.713**  (12.773)        19.598  (12.808) 
Husband has Bachelor’s degree      59.475***  (19.759)        53.709***  (19.762) 
Husband has Master’s degree      62.806***  (25.031)        53.017**  (25.081) 
Husband has law, MD, or PhD degree    228.983***  (31.672)      227.892***  (31.621) 
Husband’s age     10.168***  (4.113)         8.193**  (4.121) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 50      -0.036  (0.458)         0.056  (0.458) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 55       0.037  (0.393)         0.068  (0.392) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 60      -0.142  (0.361)        -0.431  (0.364) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 65      -0.956*  (0.466)        -1.042**  (0.466) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 70       0.058  (0.704)         0.097  (0.702) 
Husband’s race: black    -79.644***  (15.645)       -82.801***  (15.632) 
Husband’s race: Asian   -105.631**  (49.183)     -102.0**  (49.067) 
Husband’s race: Hispanic/Latino      -90.334***  (19.501)       -84.63***  (19.486) 
Husband’s race: other non-white     -97.329*  (54.824)       -91.681*  (54.856) 
Midwest     -14.06  (15.838)       -15.559  (15.829) 
South     -32.911**  (14.533)       -33.756**  (14.524) 
West      59.426***  (17.866)        56.432***  (17.84) 
Model R
2  0.228   0.233 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** = statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   20
Table 3 
Unitary Model of Household Net Worth 
  
Intercept    -958.209**  (400.021) 
Couple’s income        -0.001  (0.002) 
Income spline: over $21,000         0.005  (0.003) 
Income spline: over $32,000        -0.004  (0.003) 
Income spline: over $50,000         0.004**  (0.002) 
Income spline: over $72,000        -0.001  (0.001) 
Husband’s health excellent       44.313***  (14.589) 
Husband’s health very good       20.129  (13.361) 
Husband’s health fair         9.689  (16.606) 
Husband’s health poor      -27.404  (21.125) 
Wife’s health excellent       39.415***  (14.496) 
Wife’s health very good       54.868***  (13.368) 
Wife’s health fair       13.045  (17.161) 
Wife’s health poor      -24.426  (23.743) 
Husband’s education: 12 to 15 years       13.691  (13.181) 
Husband has Bachelor’s degree       38.667*  (20.543) 
Husband has Master’s degree       29.613  (26.529) 
Husband has law, MD, or PhD degree     196.255***  (32.916) 
Wife’s education: 12 to 15 years       27.113**  (13.894) 
Wife has Bachelor’s degree       32.186  (23.151) 
Wife has Master’s degree       78.573***  (28.97) 
Wife has law, MD, or PhD degree     195.782***  (70.108) 
Husband’s age         6.977*  (4.167) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 50        -0.099  (0.459) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 55        -0.149  (0.394) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 60        -0.203  (0.365) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 65        -0.689  (0.469) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 70         0.238  (0.702) 
Wife’s age         9.743**  (4.384) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 50        -0.901  (0.65) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 55         0.303  (0.419) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 60        -0.456  (0.379) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 65        -1.036*  (0.589) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 70        -0.703  (1.238) 
Midwest      -12.004  (15.786) 
South      -28.387**  (14.489) 
West       62.041***  (17.794) 
Husband’s race: black      -70.845***  (15.679) 
Husband’s race: Asian      -87.791*  (49.121) 
Husband’s race: Hispanic/Latino       -73.991***  (19.87) 
Husband’s race: other non-white      -80.564  (54.659) 
Model R
2  0.239 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** = statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.   21
Table 4 
Collective Models of Household Net Worth 
 
Model 1    Model 2 
Wife’s – husband’s age      9.754**  (4.384)         9.28**  (4.391) 
Wife’s – husband’s years of education      4.018  (2.766)         5.57**  (2.8) 
Wife’s share of couple’s current income         -141.42***  (21.754) 
Husband’s health excellent    44.319***  (14.588)        39.576***  (14.62) 
Husband’s health very good    20.483  (13.362)        14.551  (13.399) 
Husband’s health fair      9.181  (16.608)        14.852  (16.704) 
Husband’s health poor    -28.85  (21.146)       -20.719  (21.317) 
Wife’s health excellent     39.829*** (14.497)        43.071***  (14.511) 
Wife’s health very good     54.832*** (13.367)        58.248***  (13.398) 
Wife’s health fair     13.462  (17.162)          7.49  (17.263) 
Wife’s health poor    -23.333  (23.752)       -40.316*  (24.073) 
Husband’s education: 12 to 15 years     28.915*  (16.837)        33.488**  (16.906) 
Husband has Bachelor’s degree     65.634**  (27.686)        70.72***  (27.805) 
Husband has Master’s degree     58.748*  (33.254)        61.629*  (33.353) 
Husband has law, MD, or PhD degree   224.401*** (38.191)      216.866***  (38.259) 
Wife’s education: 12 to 15 years     16.242  (15.78)        17.209  (15.86) 
Wife has Bachelor’s degree       8.998  (28.118)        15.989  (28.24) 
Wife has Master’s degree     52.835  (33.955)        70.534**  (34.13) 
Wife has law, MD, or PhD degree   168.978**  (72.487)      201.526***  (73.945) 
Husband’s age     16.616*** (5.952)        15.903***  (5.97) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 50      -0.091  (0.459)         -0.063  (0.459) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 55      -0.148  (0.394)         -0.152  (0.395) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 60      -0.193  (0.365)         -0.129  (0.367) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 65      -0.693  (0.469)         -0.705  (0.469) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 70       0.198  (0.702)          0.271  (0.702) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 45      -0.91  (0.65)         -0.963  (0.651) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 50       0.315  (0.419)          0.35  (0.42) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 55      -0.448  (0.379)         -0.481  (0.379) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 60      -1.046*  (0.589)         -1.055*  (0.594) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 65      -0.703  (1.238)         -0.683  (1.239) 
Model R
2  0.239   0.246 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** = statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Models also include a constant term and control variables for region of residence, couple’s income, and 
husband’s race.   22
Table 5 
Add Relative Health Measures to Collective Model of Net Worth 
 
Health ratio    Health difference 
Health ratio (husband’s/wife’s value)       0.289  (16.201)       
Health difference (husband’s – wife’s value)           -11.904  (7.84) 
Wife’s – husband’s age       9.754**  (4.384)         9.769**  (4.383) 
Wife’s – husband’s years of education       4.019  (2.766)         4.136  (2.764) 
Husband’s health excellent     44.653*  (23.727)       
Husband’s health very good     20.633  (15.784)       
Husband’s health fair       9.063  (17.895)       
Husband’s health poor    -29.073  (24.567)       
Wife’s health excellent     39.381  (28.999)       
Wife’s health very good     54.701***  (15.26)       
Wife’s health fair     13.547  (17.814)       
Wife’s health poor    -23.195  (24.97)       
Husband’s health very good or excellent             7.446  (16.921) 
Husband’s health poor           -12.28  (23.897) 
Wife’s health very good or excellent            64.918***  (16.988) 
Wife’s health poor           -47.221*  (26.241) 
Husband’s education: 12 to 15 years     28.916*  (16.839)        28.563*  (16.822) 
Husband has Bachelor’s degree     65.649**  (27.7)        65.905**  (27.659) 
Husband has Master’s degree     58.759*  (33.263)        59.395*  (33.208) 
Husband has law, MD, or PhD degree   224.421***  (38.211)      225.273***  (38.147) 
Wife’s education: 12 to 15 years     16.234  (15.788)        15.864  (15.763) 
Wife has Bachelor’s degree       8.993  (28.123)          8.522  (28.112) 
Wife has Master’s degree     52.822  (33.966)        51.441  (33.932) 
Wife has law, MD, or PhD degree   168.971**  (72.496)      165.954**  (72.446) 
Husband’s age     16.617***  (5.954)        16.719***  (5.949) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 50      -0.091  (0.459)         -0.093  (0.459) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 55      -0.149  (0.394)         -0.158  (0.394) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 60      -0.193  (0.366)         -0.196  (0.365) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 65      -0.694  (0.469)         -0.683  (0.469) 
Husband’s age spline: years beyond 70       0.198  (0.702)          0.185  (0.702) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 45      -0.91  (0.65)         -0.926  (0.65) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 50       0.315  (0.419)          0.32  (0.419) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 55      -0.448  (0.379)         -0.45  (0.379) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 60      -1.046*  (0.589)         -1.051*  (0.589) 
Wife’s age spline: years beyond 65      -0.703  (1.238)         -0.687  (1.237) 
Model R
2  0.239   0.239 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*, **, *** = statistically significant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Models also include a constant term and control variables for region of residence, couple’s income, and 
husband’s race. 
 